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THE BALTIC SEA REGION  
IN THE CONTEXT OF EUROPEAN DEVELOPMENT 
 
 
 
The article analyzes the development of 
EU — Russia energy relations through the 
lens of the evolution of three parameters: the 
political agenda (the Energy Dialogue), the 
institutional structure, and the legal modali-
ties. The identification of these three aspects 
for assessing the evolution of EU — Russia 
energy relations is the novelty in the author’s 
approach. This study aims to identify the 
previous stages and assess the current state 
of EU — Russia energy dialogue, since they 
set out conditions for energy cooperation in 
the Baltic Sea region. This research is based 
on a political and legal analysis of various 
documents and employs various international 
relations theories (including integration theo-
ries). The article demonstrates that the EU 
and Russia have made a transition to the 
integration agenda manifested in the Energy 
Dialogue (its current goal is the creation of a 
common European energy market). The au-
thor describes the process of gradual con-
solidation of transgovernmental and transna-
tional institutions, which leads to depolitici-
zation of cooperation and mutual socializa-
tion of the partners. Finally, legal discussions 
on the development of common rules have 
become more constructive. In sum, the cur-
rent situation in EU — Russia energy rela-
tions is favourable and positively affects 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. 
 
Key words: EU — Russia relations, en-
ergy dialogue, energy charter, institutions 
 
 
The Baltic Sea region is an area of 
rapidly developing energy cooperation, 
which includes hydrocarbon transporta-
tion from Russia to Western and Central 
Europe, active trade in electricity, and 
energy conservation technology ex-
change. And this is not a mere coinci-
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 5 
dence. The reasons behind this are the attitudes of the Baltic Sea region 
countries towards cooperation and the region being a contact point of the 
two major actors of the Old World — Russia and the European Union — 
striving for close cooperation in energy. The EU gains resources vital for its 
economy, and the Russian Federation gets a steady inflow to its Treasury. 
The interaction between Moscow and Brussels has been largely affected by 
the density of energy relations in the Baltic. Thus, the assessment of coop-
eration prospects in the region requires a thorough analysis of the evolution 
and current state of Moscow-Brussels relations. 
In my opinion, the agenda of the Energy Dialogue launched in 2000, the 
transformation of the institutional structure of cooperation, and the modifica-
tion of legal parameters give a comprehensive description of the interaction. 
As to these three aspects, Moscow and Brussels have reached fundamentally 
new positions; it makes it possible to plan a further development of relations. 
Let us consider it in greater detail. 
 
The evolution of EU — Russia energy cooperation agenda 
 
The energy dialogue as a basis for the industry-specific political discus-
sion between Russia and the EU was launched in October 2000 in order to 
“ensure progress to be made in determining the EU — Russia energy part-
nership” [1]. The partners emphasised the need to focus on supply and de-
mand security, the efficient use of the infrastructure, and the opportunities 
for European investment. Summit declarations were followed by the work of 
expert groups that identified the most contentious and burning issues. At first 
[2], the objectives were divided into long- and short-term ones; however, this 
differentiation was soon rejected. 
If one attempts to describe the initial stage of the Dialogue with one 
word, it will be “patchwork”. The parties would pull the most acute issues 
out of the fabric of relations and try to settles them; nevertheless, they ori-
ented towards short-term objectives rather than a fundamental revision of 
relations and the development of a long-term perspective. However, some 
urgent problems were solved at the time. The parties stressed the importance 
of long-term contracts for the supply of natural gas and identified the mo-
dalities of technological cooperation (for instance, a joint technological cen-
tre was opened in Moscow). Moreover, the parameters for the cooperation in 
the field of energy efficiency were set; the EU persuaded Russia to ratify the 
Kyoto Protocol, since its coming into force was a necessary condition for all 
the participants. The priority infrastructure projects were outlined, namely, 
the Nord Stream and the second line of the Yamal-Europe pipeline, the syn-
chronous interconnection of the Russian and EU power systems, the Bur-
gas—Alexandroupoli pipeline, and the integration of the Druzhba and Adria 
systems. Finally, several meetings took place, which focused on the com-
parison of the Russian Energy Strategy [3] and similar EU documents [4; 5]. 
All the above was supposed to form a basis for joint strategic planning of 
prospects for the development of industry-specific ties; however, no progress 
ever took place. 
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In 2007, the second transit period of the Dialogue began. The year 2007 
was chosen as a starting point, since it is then that a report on the progress of 
the Energy Dialogue [6] demonstrated a change in the agenda, as well as an 
intention to transform certain institutional modalities of cooperation1. How-
ever, this transformation was a result of discussions that took place in 
2005—2007. Instead of listing particular contentious issues, the partners 
formulated the agenda. 
Firstly, the discussion focused on the strategies, forecasts, and scenarios 
for the development of power industry in Russia and the EU. This exchange 
of opinions was aimed at harmonising strategic visions of the parties so that 
the joint planning of further steps would be possible in the energy sector. 
Secondly, the parties actively discussed the market organisation; it was a 
clash of two opposite positions. The EU suggested that maximum competition 
be encouraged in the natural gas sector and generation be split from transmis-
sion. It is on this foundation that the EU was ready to create a common Euro-
pean market. Russia insisted on the gradual liberalisation of prices without the 
unbundling of energy companies with state-owned controlling interest. To a 
certain degree, the tension of this part of the dialogue was a result of the EU’s 
aspiration to impose its solutions on Russia rather than develop a common 
mutually acceptable option. In effect, the EU tried to compensate for its en-
ergy dependence on Russia through a regulatory expansion. 
Finally, the third focal point of the agenda was clean energy (an increase 
in energy efficiency, the development of renewable sources, and a reduction 
in CO2 emissions). In this case, the cooperation was rather amicable: the 
parties shared experience, harmonised legislations, implemented joint pro-
jects (including those on the basis of three energy efficiency centres in As-
trakhan, Arkhangelsk, and Kaliningrad). The parties also reached an agree-
ment on the exploitation of single-hull oil tankers. 
All in all, the second stage of the Dialogue gravitated towards the con-
vergence of positions; certain attempts at outlining joint evolution were 
made. At the same time, the cooperation in the field of clean energy showed 
that the interaction was most efficient in those areas, where the equality of 
partners was ensured. It is reached either through the convergence of na-
tional goals (the case of energy efficiency increase and the renewable 
sources development) or through cooperation in the framework of interna-
tional organisations, where Russia and the EU act as equal partners in devel-
oping solutions. 
However, neither the first nor the second stage of the Dialogue solved 
the problem of integration of the Russian and EU energy systems. This goal 
is the focus of the third stage which commenced in 2011. Its key marker is 
the draft roadmap, the common EU — Russia strategy until 2050 [7]. Ac-
cording to this document, further cooperation is to be structured according to 
industries (rather than particular problems as was the case before). The map 
gives a detailed description of the situation as well as joint plans in the field 
of energy, gas and oil industry, energy efficiency, and the development of 
                                                     
1 The evolution of the institutional structure will be considered below. 
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renewable sources. At the same time, both components necessary for a 
common energy space are taken into account: a common synchronised infra-
structure with joint standards and the harmonisation of legal frameworks 
ensuring free trade and investment. 
It is worth noting, that the parties are moving towards mutual under-
standing though settling the existing differences and trying to find mutually 
acceptable solutions. To this end, the partners adopted an extended interpre-
tation of their energy priorities in order to create an overlapping cooperation 
field. It is most pronounced in the definition of the nature of hydrocarbon 
markets. Brussels insisted on the phrasing “an integrated pan-European mar-
ket”, whereas Moscow focused on the establishment of favourable institu-
tional structures, an increase in the efficiency of generation and transmis-
sion, and the modernisation and development of new infrastructure. As a 
result, the goals set do not only comply with the national plans, but also cre-
ate a common cooperation field. 
Finally, another breakthrough of the third stage is an increasing role of 
cooperation in the field of energy efficiency. This cooperation mainly lies in 
Russia's adopting EU practices and certain technological solutions, which 
partially compensates for the EU’s vulnerability: while in the case of hydro-
carbon trade it acts as a buyer, in the field of energy efficiency Russia turns 
into a consumer and Brussels becomes a strong exporter. 
Thus, the political agenda of the EU — Russia Dialogue has evolved 
from the “patchwork” approach aimed at solving individual problems to the 
convergence of strategic plans and construction of a single European market. 
Time will tell whether this goal will be reached; however, the current nego-
tiation is a significant achievement for Moscow and Brussels which is fa-
vourable for all the initiatives undertaken in the Baltic Sea region. 
Institutional bodies and the legal framework are meant to support practi-
cal activities. Now we will address these two aspects. 
 
The evolution of EU — Russia energy cooperation institutions 
 
Modern international relations distinguish several types of institutions 
and actor interactions. The first (traditional) type is the intergovernmental 
one. Its essence is the high-level dialogue between heads of states and gov-
ernments, as well as ministers. At the initial stage, their participation is im-
portant for setting the terms of cooperation. Of equal importance is their 
contribution to adjusting the policies and settling differences. However, it is 
evident that top officials cannot tackle the problems of a single industry 
(even such an important one as energy) on a regular basis. 
The second level, whose intensive development dates back to the 20th 
century, is called “transgovernmental” by theorists [8—10]. It relates to con-
tacts between mid- and lower level public officials of one state and their 
counterparts from another country. This dialogue can also involve represen-
tatives of regulatory institutions (including those that are technically inde-
pendent of the state). At this level, cooperation lies in daily contacts aimed to 
solve current problems and ensure continuous cooperation. At the same time, 
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most decisions made at this level are of technocratic nature; the efficiency of 
such an interaction makes it possible to avoid politicisation of current issues. 
Finally, there is a transnational level. This involves contacts among 
companies and business associations, NGOs and trade unions, the scientific 
community — in other words, an aggregate of non-governmental connec-
tions, a dialogue of civil societies. The last sixty years have shown that the 
closer the cooperation between countries is and the more integrated nature it 
has, the more the transgovernmental and transnational levels are pronounced. 
To a degree, they are indicative of the dialogue density. They reached their 
maximum level in the case of EU countries. A dense cooperation network is 
characteristic of the dialogue between the EU and Norway or the USA. How 
can one assess EU — Russia energy relations according to the institutional 
parameter? At first, EU — Russia energy cooperation was supported by the 
structures created according to the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
(PCA) in 1994 [11]. According to this document, which is still of fundamen-
tal nature to Moscow and Brussels, two summits, a meeting between the 
head of the European Commission and the Russian Government, a meeting 
of the Permanent Partnership Council are to take place annually against the 
background of a dialogue between the European Parliament and the State 
Duma. The Cooperation Committee and its subcommittees — one of which 
focuses on energy — were to organise summits; however, the subcommittees 
(including the energy one) soon ceased to operate. Thus, energy issues were 
considered only at the intergovernmental level. 
This rule was also observed at the initial stage of the Energy Dialogue. 
In 2001 and 2005, special groups were set up to develop and upgrade the 
agenda. They brought together mid- and lower level officials, businesspeo-
ple, and members of the academic community. However, the work at the 
transgovernmental and transnational levels was strictly limited in time (six 
months). Thus, EU — Russia relations could not reach an integration level, 
whereas many aspects were often politicised. 
The only institutional innovation of the initial stage of the Dialogue was 
a group of exclusive negotiators, which consisted of one high-level official 
from Russia and the EU. (Russia was always represented by the minister of 
energy, as to the EU, first this position was reserved for the head of the Di-
rectorate-General for Transport and Energy, i. e. the highest energy official, 
and later the Commissioner for Energy). Thus, cooperation was granted a 
special status: the negotiators constantly “monitored” it; however, the inter-
action hardly went beyond that. 
Another novelty of the Dialogue was the development of an early warn-
ing mechanism in 2006 (after the Russian-Ukrainian conflict which resulted 
in irregular gas supplies to EU countries). The mechanism was of limited 
efficiency; it was designed as a preventive measure (prevention of conflict 
escalation) rather than to promote an integration form of cooperation. As a 
result, it failed to prevent the 2009 conflict and reputational damage to Rus-
sia. It is only logical that the mechanism was upgraded later. 
The most radical institutional innovation was the introduction of perma-
nent thematic groups in 2007. The resulting structure of the EU — Russia 
Energy Dialogue is shown in fig. 1. 
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In other words, the result was the development of permanent collabora-
tion at the transgovernmental level, which proved its efficiency in 2008 dur-
ing the Russian-Georgian conflict, when, as a response to Moscow’s actions 
against Tbilisi, many high-level contacts were frozen by the EU. To many 
officials' surprise, this did not affect current collaboration. The mid- and 
lower level experts carried on with their daily tasks. Another achievement of 
2007 was the fact that all the three thematic areas got their institutional sup-
port (permanent groups). 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. The institutional structure of the Energy Dialogue in 2007—2011 
 
However, it was not the final stage of the institutional transformation. In 
2011, as the thematic focus of the Energy Dialogue changed, it underwent 
further alterations. The resulting structure is shown in fig. 2. 
Despite the fact that planning and integration of markets concern all sec-
tors, only the groups on strategy, electricity, nuclear energy, and energy effi-
ciency were set up. How can this be explained? It seems that the existing 
structure was created not only in order to establish a common European 
market by 2050 (it is the task of the first thematic group), but also to tackle 
the aspects that would transform the cooperation from a mere exchange of 
gas for “delicacies” into industrial cooperation and trading in processed en-
ergy products. It is not a coincidence that the latter two groups (on nuclear 
energy and energy efficiency) are closely connected with the Partnership for 
Modernisation signed by Russia and the EU in 2010, which also has a fa-
vourable effect on relations in the Baltic Sea region characterised by active 
trade in energy efficient technologies. 
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Fig. 2. The institutional structure of the Energy Dialogue since 2011 
 
Cooperation at the transnational level is also developing rapidly. The ba-
sic business cooperation structure (EU — Russia Industrialists Round Table) 
also includes a group on energy. Contacts have been established between 
Eurogas (an association representing the European gas sector) and the Rus-
sian Gas Society; between Eurelectric (an association of EU electrical power 
companies) and Russian electrical power companies. European companies 
purchased assets in the Russian energy industry, whereas Russian enterprises 
bought those on the territory of the EU, although with mixed results. Finally, 
the cooperation of environmental organisations and the academic community 
is also developing. 
Thus, at the moment, Russian and EU energy sector exhibits a trend to-
wards a gradual consolidation of transgovernmental and transnational rela-
tions. It has at least two consequences. The first one is the gradual depolitici-
zation of the dialogue, the transition of most problems from summit discus-
sions to the technocratic level. The second one is a gradual socialisation of 
officials, businesspeople, and NGOs. In a long-term perspective, this process 
should encourage mutual understanding and create a stable framework for 
the cooperation development. 
However, alongside functioning institutions, stable energy relations also 
require a solid legal framework, whose evolution in the case of Russian and 
the EU relationships will be considered in the conclusive part of the article. 
 
The legal tools of the EU — Russia energy relations 
 
The PCA of 1994 [11] did not contain any special provisions on energy; 
all relevant aspects were covered in one article. It was logical, because the 
PCA contained a direct reference to the Energy charter [12] and the corre-
sponding Treaty (ECT) [13]. It is worth noting that the authors of the ECT 
designed it as a framework for a new community, which will include the 
whole post-Soviet space alongside the European Union [14]. It is not a coinci-
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dence that the legal texts were based on the current EU energy legislation and, 
first of all, the concept of market liberalisation and competition promotion. 
However, Russia — having taken part in the development of both docu-
ments — kept on postponing the ECT ratification and, finally, withdrew 
from it in 2009. The reasons behind this decision are well-known. These 
include the fact that the Charter and the ECT pursue the interests of consum-
ers rather than suppliers, a concern that Russia could be forced to open the 
pipelines for the free transit of Central Asiatic gas to Europe, as well as the 
lack of provisions on nuclear energy, which left the ECT without its only 
possible Russian lobbyist (Rosatom). Moscow’s decision resulted in a legal 
vacuum in EU — Russia energy relations. Brussels insisted on Russia's rati-
fying the ECT; in practice, the partners relied either on the general rules of 
international law or contractual obligations. 
The second stage of the legal evolution of EU — Russia relations can be 
dated back to 2006. While during the preparation of the Energy Charter and 
the ECT Brussels played the key role, at the second stage Russia tried to take 
priority in relevant decision-making. The dominant concern was Moscow’s 
aspiration to create a new regime, which would be based on the needs of not 
only consumers, but also suppliers. Major significance was attached to the 
concept of global energy security. For the first time, it was presented during 
the Russian presidency of the G8 in 2006, when energy became one of the key 
topics [15]. However, it was expressed in the form of the soft law (general 
declarations and principles which did not have any legally binding force). 
This declaration was followed by the Kremlin’s attempts to fill them 
with specific legal content. For instance, one can remember the transit pro-
posals [16] and the draft convention on energy security [17] drawn up in 
2009. Neither document was warmly welcomed in Brussels, EU member 
states insisted unanimously on the ECT. 
The third stage of the development of the legal framework for EU — 
Russia relations began in 2012. It relates to at least three aspects. The most 
important one is Russia’s accession to the WTO in August 2012. If one con-
siders gas, coal, and electricity as goods (which is a fundamental rule of 
modern international law), trade is regulated by transparent rules. Moreover, 
for the first time, Moscow and Brussels got a judicial institution that could 
resolve conflicts of trade and economic nature. 
The second aspect is the negotiation on the framework agreement be-
tween Russia and the EU, which commenced as early as 2008 and intensified 
after the Russian accession to the WTO. One of the stumbling stones of 
these discussions is the question as to whether energy should be included 
into the main context. The EU strives to make this section as detailed as 
possible and fill it with specific content (borrowing it from the ECT and its 
internal legislation), whereas the Russian position is that the framework 
agreement should be concise and all industry-specific aspects (including 
energy) be regulated by additional protocols. 
Finally, the third aspect of the current stage of legal development in the 
field of energy is the renewed negotiations on the possibility of Russia’s 
return to the ECT after the revision of the text. This step would be, of course, 
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the most constructive solution to the problem of a lack of legally binding 
rules in the European energy sector. It would help harmonise the positions of 
the key consumer (EU) and supplier (Russia). 
Thus, the evolution of the legal framework has not been completed yet; 
however, one can assert that the parties are gradually moving towards con-
structive collaboration. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The above analysis shows that the political agenda, institutional provi-
sions, and legal provisions regulating the EU — Russia energy relations 
have evolved significantly. Today, they are at a rather favourable stage. As 
to the energy cooperation agenda, Moscow and Brussels moved from the 
‘patchwork’ approach to long-term planning and delineating the European 
energy market. One can speak about the consolidation of transnational and 
transgovernmental levels, which support the intergovernmental dialogue and 
contribute to its depoliticization and stabilisation. Finally, the legal aspect 
shows trends towards overcoming legal vacuum, which are manifested so far 
through international institutions (the WTO and, potentially, the revised 
ECT). A possibility of negotiations on a new bilateral framework agreement 
is considered now as a contingency plan, largely because of the Russian 
position. 
Despite certain procrastination in the legal field, it seems that a positive 
context is shaping up for the development of energy cooperation of the par-
ties. It will certainly have a beneficial effect on cooperation in the Baltic Sea 
region. 
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